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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper tries to make the case for a variant of the good life based on a synthesis of 
liberalism and ethnicity. Liberal communitarianism's treatment of ethnicity tends to fall 
under the categories of either liberal culturalism or liberal nationalism. Both, it is 
argued, fail to come to terms with the reality of ethnic community, preferring instead to 
define ethnicity in an unrealistic, cosmopolitan manner. A further problem concerns the 
tendency of these theories to focus on political and cultural questions, while ignoring the 
deeper issues of ethnic boundary-maintenance and mytho-symbolic particularism. In 
contrast, this essay squarely confronts four practices that are central to the reality of 
ethnic community: symbolic boundary-maintenance; exclusive and inflexible ethnic 
mythomoteurs; the use of ancestry and race as group boundary markers; and the desire 
among national groups to maintain their ethnic character. This paper argues that none of 
these ethnic practices need contravene the tenets of liberalism so long as they are 
reconstructed in such a way as to minimise entry criteria and decouple national ethnicity 
from the state. The notion of liberal ethnicity thereby constitutes an important synthesis 
of liberal and communitarian ends. 
 
Keywords: Liberalism, Ethnicity, Liberal Ethnicity, Liberal Nationalism, Minority 
Rights, Ethnic Boundaries 
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A basic premise of this argument will be that we must carefully distinguish 
between two normative planes, the procedural and the substantive. The distinction 
between these two levels of advocacy is particularly germane to discussions about 
liberalism and cultural community because most political theorists typically advance a 
two-pronged agenda. On the one hand, they set forth a model for the optimal organisation 
of the polity, a theory of negative liberty which often seeks an amicable way of regulating 
competing individual and group claims through state policy and constitutional legislation. 
Terms such as consociation, federalism and liberal democracy figure prominently in such 
debates.1 On the other hand, many theorists nest a positive theory of liberty (to use Isaiah 
Berlin's phrase) or vision of the good life, within their ideas which sketches an 
ontological-aesthetic model for social behaviour.2 The ideal of individual autonomy and 
that of the communally-embedded self are examples.3  
Within liberalism, there is a lively discussion between communitarian-liberals and 
individualist-liberals over the form of the good life which ought to be normatively 
endorsed by the secular public sphere - even as there is broad agreement over liberal-
democratic fundamentals.4 Furthermore, within communitarian discourse lies a great 
diversity of theories about the good.  
In this article, I will distinguish between several varieties of communitarian good: 
culture, cultural groups, national groups and, in particular, ethnic groups. I hope to 
demonstrate that liberalism must come to terms with all facets of each type of 
communitarian good, rather than merely achieving a hazy accommodation with 'culture' 
or 'community' in the abstract. Moreover, I shall contend that as we move from cultural 
group to national group to ethnic group, the challenge for liberal communitarians 
increases in intensity.  
                                                          
1 See, for instance, O'Leary, B & John McGarry (eds.), The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation (New 
York & London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 1-40; Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies. A 
Comparative Exploration (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1977). 
2 Berlin, Isaiah, Two Concepts of Liberty (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958), pp. 13-14. 
3 Taylor, Charles, Sources of the Self: the Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), pp.36-9, 390; Taylor, Charles, The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge, MA : 
Harvard University Press, 1992) 
4 For example, Michael Walzer distinguishes between a 'Liberalism I' covering basic liberties, and a more 
communitarian 'Liberalism II' which encompasses collective rights. See Walzer's comment in Taylor, 
Charles, Multiculturalism and The Politics of Recognition: An Essay, with commentary by Amy Gutmann, 
editor...[et al.]. (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 99. 
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Culture, Ethnic Group and Nation 
 
An initial step in the direction of meeting this challenge is to clarify our terminology in 
such a way as to minimise the space for semantic 'solutions' which skirt logical problems 
by adopting rhetorical sophistry. As problematic as this may sound, it is vital if we are to 
expose and surmount the axes of conflict between liberalism and ethnicity. This demands 
an outline of the differences between our key terms of ethnic group, nation, and culture. 
In much academic literature, these concepts are elided, and the relationship between them 
is difficult to ascertain. Hence too much empirical and theoretical writing tends to equate 
'nation' with majority and 'ethnic' with minority, all the while subsuming both under the 
umbrella term 'culture.' 
To a great extent, the recent work of Will Kymlicka, who makes clear use of the 
term 'minority nation,' has helped to change this thinking. Other contemporary theorists 
of liberal nationalism like Joseph Raz, Yael Tamir and David Miller have built sturdy 
structures upon Kymlicka's foundation. All have recognised that nations can be 
minorities within a particular state.5 However, it remains the case that many political 
theorists, in tandem with their counterparts in the social sciences, continue to equate 
'ethnic group' with minority. It seems that only minorities are considered ethnic, a 
perspective which can be traced to Donald Young's pioneering study of American ethnic 
groups, American Minority Peoples (1932).  
The previous discussion has suggested that the link between ethnic groups and 
minorities must be challenged. Indeed, it seems that if we are to take ethnicity seriously, 
we must ask how majority ethnic groups enter our moral universe. Yet this begs the 
question of exactly what an ethnic group is: in too much normative theory, definitions of 
the term ethnic group appear imprecise or inconsistent. This task of obfuscation is 
compounded by the reduction of both ethnic groups and nations to 'cultures.' Notice that I 
am not claiming that terminological ambiguity can be eliminated - a Herculean task in the 
social sciences. However, if a strong measure of conceptual clarity is not present, 
                                                          
5 See, for example, J.Raz and A. Margalit, 'National Self-determination,' Journal of Philosophy, 87 (1990), 
pp. 439-61; Tamir, Yael, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), p. 76. 
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interlocutors in this debate will simply be able to resolve logical dilemmas through 
semantic maneuver, all the while talking past each other. 
Let us begin with the nation. Indeed, Will Kymlicka accurately defines 'national 
minorities' as indigenous cultural units which comprise an 'intergenerational community, 
more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing a 
distinct language and history.'6 This definition of the nation strongly conforms to those 
advanced by writers who work on empirical problems of nationalism.7  
However, the same cannot be said for ethnicity. Supporters of group rights like 
Iris Marion Young and Charles Taylor seem content to speak only of the rights of 
minority 'cultures' which differ in some way from that of the majority secular culture.8  
This is too general an approach, one that fails to address the critical differences which 
mark off various types of cultural group. It is these differences which determine whether 
a cultural group is ethnic, religious or merely 'cultural.' Not surprisingly, certain cultural 
groups, notably lifestyle subcultures and religious sects, take more easily to the liberal 
model of voluntary association. It is not sufficient, therefore, to speak of liberal 
culturalism, a theory best suited to forms of cultural association which are not located in a 
space-time (ie. kinship and territory) segment and maintain few barriers to entry. Instead, 
we must advance independent theories that address more communitarian forms of 
cultural group, like nation or ethnie (ethnic group). Such theories would be called liberal 
nationalism, a term which is now with us, and liberal ethnicity, which is not. 
                                                          
6 Kymlicka, Will, Multicultural Citizenship: a Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), p.18. 
7 Symmons-Symonolowicz, K., 'The Concept of Nationhood: Toward a Theoretical Clarification,' 
Canadian Review of Studies of Nationalism, XII, II (1985), p.221; Connor, Walker, 'A nation is a nation, is 
a state, is an ethnic group, is a ....,' in Smith, A.D. and John Hutchinson, Nationalism, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), p. 39. 
8 Taylor nevertheless qualifies his remarks to emphasise the greater significance of national and ethnic 
culture. See Taylor, Charles in Taylor and Gutmann (eds.), Multiculturalism and The Politics of 
Recognition, pp. 38, 42. 
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Of course, some normative political thinkers have recognised the need to specify 
differences between different varieties of cultural community. Vernon Van Dyke's 
understanding of ethnicity, for example, is incisive, however his discussion suffers 
because it identifies ethnicity as a more or less exclusively minority phenomenon.9 Will 
Kymlicka, by contrast, has distinguished himself by explicitly using and defining terms 
like ethnic group and nation - and this is to be commended. Yet Kymlicka's definition of 
ethnicity does not accord with accepted social scientific conventions. For example, he 
claims that ethnic groups differ from nations because the former involve uprooted, 
territorially disparate immigrant groups while the latter describe indigenous communities 
in their homeland contexts.10 Kymlicka has certainly identified an important distinction,11 
however, few would support using his criteria to distinguish ethnic groups from nations. 
Instead, the term ethnic group should be reserved for communities which possess 
a belief in their shared genealogical descent and meet a threshold requirement that 
distinguishes them from smaller-scale phenomena like clans and tribes or larger ones like 
pan-ethnies.12 Ethnicity describes social thought and action based on this putative 
ancestry. Therefore, what Kymlicka describes as an ethnocultural (or immigrant) group 
may be more clearly described as a secondary ethnic group, while the indigenous entities 
he labels minority nations are better referred to as primary ethnic groups.13  
                                                          
9 Van Dyke, Vernon, 'The Individual, the State, and Ethnic Communities in Political Theory,' in Will 
Kymlicka (ed.), The Rights of Minority Cultures (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 32. 
10 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p.15; Kymlicka, Will, 'The Sources of Nationalism: Commentary 
on Taylor,' in Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan (eds.), The Morality of Nationalism (New York/Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 59. 
11 Notably the distinction between indigenous and immigrant groups which underpins claims to national 
self-determination. For more, see Horowitz, Donald L. Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1985), pp. 201-3. 
12 See Weber, Max, 'The Origins of Ethnic Groups,' in Smith, A.D. and John Hutchinson, Ethnicity 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 35; Anthony Smith, National Identity (London: Penguin, 
1991), p.40; Francis, E.K., Interethnic Relations, (New York: Elsevier Scientific, 1976), p.6; Van Dyke, 
Vernon, 'The Individual, the State, and Ethnic Communities in Political Theory,' p. 32. 
13 Eriksen, Thomas Hylland, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives (London: Pluto 
Press, 1993), p. 12; Francis, Interethnic Relations, p.6. 
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Some primary ethnies have attained enough territorial, political, cultural and 
economic integration to qualify as nations, and, of these, some have developed into 
nation-states. Notice that nations need not possess a myth of genealogical descent, though 
they require some sense of collective memory and a definite territory.14 Ethnic groups, by 
contrast, need not occupy their homeland, though they require a shared myth of ancestry. 
Cultural attributes must in turn be distinguished from both ethnic groups and 
nations. Most important, cultures can exist without possessing a sense of self-
consciousness. For example, most speakers of French, English and other European 
vernacular languages15 did not possess collective self-consciousness until the late 
medieval or modern period.16 No doubt the same could be said for most Chinese 
Confucians and European Christians in the middle ages. The mass of the population 
participated in these cultures in much the same way as we interact with modern consumer 
society: unconsciously.17 
Hence they participated in a culture and had a 'context' for their lives, but had no 
related communal identity vis à vis other groups. Therefore these broad culture zones 
were usually unable to coalesce into mass-based social actors.18  In short, tradition does 
not equate with traditionalism - the latter requiring a self-consciousness that is largely to 
be found in modernity. In this sense, cultural revivals, such as the Welsh revival of the 
late 18th century or the Hindu revival of the late 19th, are often modern phenomena, even 
if the cultures they revived often had a much longer pedigree.19  
                                                          
14 Clearly, the definition of 'nation' remains contested. Walker Connor, for example, defines the nation as a 
'self-aware ethnic group,' while Anthony Giddens speaks of nations as  'bordered power containers' created 
by the state. See discussion in Smith, A.D. and John Hutchinson (eds.), Nationalism (Oxford & New York, 
N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 34, 45.  I prefer to navigate between these positions along the 
lines set out by A.D. Smith - a current of thought which treats nations as integrated communities of shared 
history, territory and mass culture. Modern nations thus draw upon pre-modern ethnic myths and symbols, 
though the link may become attenuated over time. 
15 This picture was complicated not only by differences of usage between the court and the masses, but also 
by distinctions based on regional dialect. See discussion in Haugen, Einar, 'Dialect, Language, Nation,' 
American Anthropologist, Vol. 68, no. 4 (1966), pp. 922-35. 
16 To be sure, there were numerous exceptions to this rule, such as the ancient Israelites or medieval French 
and English. These arguments may be found in Armstrong, John,  Nations Before Nationalism (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982, chs. 1,3; Grosby, S. 1991. 'Religion and Nationality in 
Antiquity,' European Journal of Sociology XXXII, pp. 229-65; Smith, Anthony D. The Ethnic Origins of 
Nations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), pp. 32-119. 
17 I refer of course to consumer society as a whole, not to consumer lifestyle subcultures. 
18 The classic modernist treatment of this subject is Hobsbawm, Eric J, Nations and Nationalism since 
1780. Programme, Myth, Reality. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), ch. 3. See also 
Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
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Accordingly, we have no grounds for speaking of cultures as 'synonymous with a 
nation or a people.'20 Instead, what we may say is that cultural symbols may function as 
markers for ethnic and national boundaries while cultural myths might furnish the 
material for group narratives. In all cases, however, the ethnic or national community is 
the active agent, not the culture. Therefore it is all the more pressing that we synthesise 
liberalism with active communities, and not merely passive cultures. Cultures may offer 
us contexts of choice, and this may further the aims of liberalism. However, what really 
ought to concern us is the manner in which liberalism can accommodate communities' 
use of cultural contexts for the purposes of boundary demarcation and mytho-symbolic 
group narration.  
Hopefully the preceding discussion should make it clear that culture, ethnic group 
and nation are discrete concepts which are nevertheless strongly related. The relationship 
consists in the fact that both nation and ethnic group are cultural communities. The 
distinction turns on the communitarian activities of these groups. Ethnic communities  are 
more symbolically exclusive than nations, which in turn are more exclusive than many 
cultural groups. This suggests that reconciling liberalism with ethnic communities will  
present greater difficulties than reconciling liberalism with national community, which 
will in turn be an easier task than synthesizing liberalism with non-segmental21 cultural 
communities.  
 
The Cosmopolitanism of Liberal Communitarianism 
 
 The problematic of this paper is the relationship between liberalism and ethnic 
community - one of the most communal forms of cultural group. However, any 
consideration of ethnic groups inevitably entails a discussion of nations as well, since a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(London: Verso, 1983), chs. 1-3, and Gellner, Ernest, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), 
chs. 2-3. 
19 On traditionalism versus tradition, see Eriksen, Ethnicity & Nationalism, p.101; Hobsbawm, Eric and 
Terence Ranger (eds.), The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge University Press); For discussion of cultural 
revival, see Hutchinson, John, The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism (London: Allen and Unwin, 1987); 
Smith, A.D., The Ethnic Revival (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Kammen, Michael, The 
Mystic Chords of Memory: The Transformation of Tradition in American Culture (New York, NY: Vintage 
Books, 1991). 
20 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 18. 
21 Segmental communities are spatially and genealogically delineated units.  
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state's national project is inextricably bound up with its ethnic conflict management 
regime.22 
 Hence, in our consideration of current liberal philosophies of ethnicity, we must 
consider theories of both liberal nationalism and liberal culturalism - each of which can 
yield insights into the way ethnicity has been theorised in liberal discourse. In the 
process, we shall find that liberal culturalists and liberal nationalists share a similar 
orientation toward ethnicity which may be characterised as cosmopolitan in the broadest 
sense. This theoretical consensus embodies the following elements: 
 
1) Unease with practices of ethnic boundary-maintenance 
2) A preference for inclusive, flexible and thin ethnic mythomoteurs23 
3) The treatment of ancestry and race as morally retrograde group symbols 
4) Opposition to national ethnicity, despite an affirmation of transnational ethnicity 
 
We shall presently be returning to a discussion of these elements. At this stage, I merely 
wish to register that, in combination, these principles are in direct conflict with several 
imperatives of ethnic community. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
22 Here we must distinguish between state-nationalism, or nationalism from 'above,' and ethnic nationalism, 
which arises from the ethnic group(s) 'below.' Multi-ethnic states usually seek to foster a sense of civic 
nationalism among their citizens, but this is a more difficult process than the modern transformation of 
ethnic groups into nations. See Plamenatz, John 1973. ‘Two Types of Nationalism,’ in Eugene Kamenka 
(ed) Nationalism: the Nature and Evolution of an Idea (Canberra: Australian National Press); Kohn, Hans, 
'Eastern and Western Nationalisms,' in Smith & Hutchinson, Nationalism, pp. 162-5. 
 10
The Cosmopolitan Ideal 
 
'A…genuine cosmopolitanism is first of all an orientation, a willingness to engage 
with the Other,' remarks Ulf Hannerz. 'It is an intellectual and aesthetic stance of 
openness toward divergent cultural experiences, a search for contrasts rather than 
uniformity.'24 Jeremy Waldron adds that cosmopolitans refuse to be defined by location, 
ancestry, citizenship or language - the constituent ingredients of ethnie and nation. 
Hannerz' and Waldron's exposition of the cosmopolitan ideal harmonises well with the 
Hellenic conception of the world citizen which gave rise to the term. Cosmopolitanism 
has always espoused a principled opposition to ethno-cultural confines, a stance which 
drew criticism from early nationalist theorists like Rousseau and Herder.25  
Notice that liberal cosmopolitanism is inherently opposed to the concept of the 
boundary, whether this be in space (ie. territory) or time (ie. ancestry and history). No 
wonder it has difficulty with ethnicity, which: 
 
With its stress on a beginning and flow in time, and a delimitation in space, raises 
barriers to the flood of meaninglessness and absurdity that might otherwise engulf 
human beings. It tells them that they belong to ancient associations of 'their kind' 
with definite boundaries in time and space, and this gives their otherwise 
ambiguous and precarious lives a degree of certainty and purpose….26    
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
23 This term refers to the 'constitutive myth of the ethnic polity,' used here as being analogous to the ethnic 
group's myth-symbol complex. Smith, Ethnic Origins of Nations, p. 15; Armstrong, John, Nations Before 
Nationalism, pp. 8-9, 293. 
24 Hannerz, Ulf, 'Cosmopolitans and Locals in World Culture,' Theory, Culture and Society, Vol.7, 1990, p. 
239; Waldron, Jeremy, 'Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative,' in Will Kymlicka, The Rights 
of Minority Cultures, p. 95. 
25 Newman, Gerald, The Rise of English Nationalism: a Cultural History (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), 
chs. 1-2; Smith, Anthony D., 'The Supersession of Nationalism?,' International Journal of Comparative 
Sociology, 31, 1-2, 1990, pp. 1-25. 
26 Regis Debray, paraphrased in Smith, Ethnic Origins of Nations, pp. 175-6. 
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In other words, the cardinal issue separating ethnics from cosmopolitans is the status of 
existential space-time boundaries. Ethnics wish these boundaries to be secure, while 
cosmopolitans desire to transcend them in the name of either an abstract universalism or a 
de-centred, multicultural expressivism.27 Moreover, the practice of cosmopolitanism and 
ethnicity are distinctly at odds, to wit, the individual who spends time exploring her own 
ethnic background accrues less cosmopolitan capital than the individual who commits 
herself full-time to exotic experience.  
The position of liberal cosmopolitans is clear, but where does this leave the liberal 
communitarian approach to the question of positive liberty? What I wish to suggest is that 
there exists a liberal communitarian 'consensus' which favours a cosmopolitan variant of 
the Good. Liberal nationalist writers similarly embrace this cosmopolitanism, though they 
restrict its application within the territorial confines of the political nation.  
Now this runs very much against the conventional belief that liberal culturalists 
and liberal nationalists are communitarian in their orientation toward the good. However, 
if we examine the relationship between liberal communitarians and the communities they 
seek to protect, we must draw the conclusion that their multicultural convictions are 
ultimately cosmopolitan. This stems from our earlier point that liberal communitarians 
tend to manifest four tendencies that run counter to ethnic practice: 
  
1) Unease with practices of ethnic boundary-maintenance 
2) A preference for inclusive, flexible and thin ethnic mythomoteurs 
3) The treatment of ancestry and race as morally retrograde group symbols 
4) Opposition to national ethnicity, despite an affirmation of transnational ethnicity 
 
Let us consider each in turn. 
 
 
 
                                                          
27 On the universalism-cosmopolitanism distinction, see Hollinger, David A. Postethnic America: Beyond 
Multiculturalism (New York, NY: Harper Collins, 1995). On the relationship between modern 
individualism and cosmopolitanism, see Bell, Daniel, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism (New 
York, NY: Harper Collins, 1996), p. 13. 
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Ethnic Boundaries in Liberal Culturalist Theory 
 
 Fredrik Barth famously pointed out that while population can flow across ethnic 
boundaries over time, these boundaries tend to remain remarkably resilient.28 Such 
symbolic boundaries, or cultural markers, typically include one or more of either 
phenotype, language or religion. Generally speaking, however, the task of boundary-
maintenance tends to rest less with individuals on the frontier (which Barth suggested) 
than with intellectuals and their institutions, like churches and historical societies, which 
are often affiliated with major cultural centres.29 For example, the survival of the Greek 
language and identity under the Ottomans was intimately linked with the Orthodox 
church and its patriarchate, based at Constantinople.30 In analogous fashion, ethnic 
revivals were often orchestrated by nineteenth century romantic intellectuals in major 
centres of learning,  Ludovit Stur, for example, in Slovakia and Elias Lönnrot in 
Finland.31 
The task of boundary-maintenance is central to ethnicity. Without the entry 
barriers and assimilation pressures which boundary-maintenance entails, members of an 
ethnic group would not possess markers by which to identify one another. Boundary 
symbols also serve the ontological function of providing meaning and existential security 
to ethnic individuals. Michael Walzer has therefore correctly identified the importance of 
boundaries to the ethnic process. For, as he notes, 'the distinctiveness of cultures and 
groups depends upon closure and, without it, cannot be conceived as a stable feature of 
human life. If this distinctiveness is a value, as most people…seem to believe, then 
closure must be permitted somewhere.'32  
                                                          
28 Barth, F. ,ed., Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organisation of Culture Difference (London: 
Allen and Unwin, 1969), pp. 20-25. 
29 Roosens, Eugeen. 'The primordial nature of origins in migrant ethnicity,' in Hans Vermeulen and Cora 
Govers (eds.), The Anthropology of Ethnicity: Beyond 'Ethnic Groups and Boundaries,' (Amsterdam: Het 
Spinhuis, 1994), p. 84; Charles F. Keyes (ed.), Ethnic Change (Seattle, WA: University of Washington 
Press, 1981). 
30 Kitromilides, Paschalis, ' 'Imagined communities' and the origins of the national question in the Balkans,' 
European History Quarterly, 19: 2 (1989), pp. 177-85. 
31 Smith, Ethnic Origins of Nations, p. 136; Smith, National Identity, p.67. 
32 Walzer, Michael, Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), 
p.39. 
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Many liberal communitarians do not rule out closure, yet they are clearly 
uncomfortable with it, and are thus quick to qualify it. For instance, while Will Kymlicka 
appears to endorse Walzer's position regarding the importance of boundaries, he 
nevertheless insists that modern ethnic groups are becoming more like cultural 
associations than ascriptive communities of birth. Kymlicka, however, is clearly divided 
on the matter, as he stops short of advocating the inclusion of 'quasi-ethnic' New Social 
Movements (NSMs) within the multiculturalism paradigm. He also notes that NSMs like 
gays and the deaf 'are not "ethnic," strictly speaking, since they are not defined by a 
common ethnic descent, but they are certainly "cultural".' To resolve the terminological 
ambiguity his statement raises, Kymlicka admits that ethnicity has been defined by 
descent in the past, but that the normative justification for ethnicity has recently shifted 
from race to culture.33  
This begs the question of what now distinguishes ethnic groups from other kinds 
of historical communities (ie. religious denominations or fraternal orders) or cultural 
groups (such as gays or the deaf). Kymlicka appears not to have a clear answer here. His 
interesting comparison with NSMs, for example, seems to indicate that he views these 
entities as essentially ethnic - even as he avers that, for practical reasons, we may not 
wish to include them under the rubric of multiculturalism.34  
                                                          
33 Kymlicka, Will, Finding Our Way: Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations in Canada (Oxford & New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 95-7, emphasis added. 
34 Kymlicka, Finding Our Way, pp. 102-3. 
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Of course, we must be careful to contextualise Kymlicka's thesis. It represents the 
most articulate liberal attempt, within a century-long tradition, to accommodate ethnic 
community. Yet Kymlicka's ideas are still very much in keeping with the outlines of the 
'cosmopolitan' model of ethnic relations first sketched by American Liberal Progressives 
of the 1900-1917 period as a reaction against Anglo-Protestant ethnic nationalism.35 
Indeed, one can argue that this form of anti-nationalism continues to play a central role in 
contemporary multiculturalism discourse.36  
The new cosmopolitan approach was, not surprisingly, a hybrid one, featuring 
both universalist and particularist aims. It thus represented a fusion of melting pot and 
mosaic, individualism and collectivism. The particularist aims of the Liberal Progressives 
included: 
 
1- An opposition to the anglo-conformist (though not liberal-modern) assimilation of 
immigrants, as this was seen to denigrate the immigrants' culture and self-worth, as well 
as to retard the onset of cosmopolitan civilisation;  
 
                                                          
35 This body of thought germinated with the Pluralist ideas of William James and Felix Adler in the 1890's, 
and, later, engaged John Dewey, Jane Addams and other Chicago intellectuals and social workers. The best 
treatment of this subject may be found in Lissak, Rivka S. Pluralism and Progressives: Hull House and the 
New Immigrants, 1890-1919, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989). Broadly speaking, the Liberal 
Progressive model of ethnic relations continued to hold sway in progressive secular and religious circles in 
the twenties and thirties, and eventually fed into multiculturalism in the late 1960's.  
36 Ceaser, James, 'Multiculturalism and American Liberal Democracy,' in Arthur M. Melzer, Jerry W. 
Weinberger and M. Richard Zinman (eds.), Multiculturalism and American Democracy (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 1998), pp. 139-155; Bonnett, Alastair. 'Constructions of Whiteness in European 
and American Anti-Racism,' in Pnina Werbner and Tariq Modood (eds.), Debating Cultural Hybridity 
(London: Zed Books, 1997), pp. 173-92. 
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2- A celebration of the cultural diversity introduced into the United States through 
immigration, both in its own right, and as a 'contribution' to the American whole. This 
philosophy was incarnated in Jane Addams' immigrant 'labor museum' at the Hull 
settlement house during 1905-10, which helped to cultivate immigrant arts, crafts and 
history. This, she hoped, would reduce alienation between immigrants, their children and 
their new society.37 A corollary of this is that the Liberal Progressives, joined after 1910 
by American ecumenical Protestant leaders, opposed immigration restriction (embodied 
in American acts of 1912, 1917 and 1924).38 In fact, it is interesting to note that they were 
among the only Anglo-Americans to defend immigration on egalitarian grounds.39  
  
Added to the Liberal Progressives' pluralism, however, were several universalist 
prescriptions: 
 
1- An endorsement of inter-ethnic contact and hybridity. Immigration, cross-cultural 
interaction and inter-ethnic marriage were considered advantageous for society and 
conducive to richer and higher levels of civilisation. 'The dangerous thing,' declared John 
Dewey in 1916, 'is for one factor to isolate itself, to try to live off its past and then to 
impose itself upon other elements, or at least to keep itself intact and thus refuse to accept 
what other cultures have to offer.'40; 
 
                                                          
37 Carson, Miva, Settlement Folk: social thought and the American settlement movement, 1885-1930 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 105-9. 
38 Davis, Allen B., Spearheads for Reform: the Social Settlements and the Progressive Movement, 1890-
1914 (New York, NY: Oxford University Press), p. 93. 
39 Miller, Robert Moats, American Protestantism and Social Issues, 1919-39 (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1958), pp. 291-2. 
40 Lissak, Pluralism and Progressives, p. 156. 
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2- A vision of a cosmopolitan civilisation to which all cultures would make a 
contribution. 'Symphony,' 'quilt,' and, surprisingly, 'melting pot,' were  metaphors that 
were used, often interchangeably, to characterise this hoped-for state of affairs.41 As 
Randolph Bourne put it, the immigrants were 'threads of living and potent cultures, 
blindly striving to weave themselves into a novel international nation, the first the world 
has seen.'42  
 
Hence the new cosmopolitan philosophy of ethnic relations valued the diversity brought 
by the ethnic culture of the immigrants and sought to protect it, yet viewed the practice of 
ethnic community with distaste. This creed also elaborated a vision of the United States 
(and the world), which strove to integrate these ethnic cultures into a cosmopolitan whole 
- without somehow ironing them into uniformity. 
 Today's multiculturalism is less equivocal about its cosmopolitan goals than its 
pluralist predecessors. However, the statements of its practitioners bespeak an identical 
result. For example, Stanley Fish, Will Kymlicka and other liberal multiculturalists all 
refer to multiculturalism as a form of equitable inclusion - not separation.43 Kymlicka's 
attempt to harmonise multiculturalist ideals with Jeremy Waldron's cosmopolitanism 
provides further evidence of this liberal culturalist 'consensus.'44 Furthermore, there exists 
a general endorsement of inter-ethnic marriage as a positive indicator of integration - a 
posture which orthodox pluralists like Horace Kallen would abhor.45 Add to this the 
recent vision of the American nation as a 'kaleidoscope' or 'multiply-constituted' entity, 
and we arrive at a complete restatement of Liberal Progressive cosmopolitanism.46 
                                                          
41 Gleason, Philip, Speaking of Diversity: Language and Ethnicity in Twentieth-Century America 
(Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), pp. 13-22. 
42 Bourne, Randolph S. [1916], 'Trans-National America,' in Carl Resek (ed.), War and the Intellectuals: 
Collected Essays, 1915-1919 (New York, NY: Harper Torchbooks, 1964), p. 120. 
43 Glazer, Nathan, We Are All Multiculturalists Now (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), p. 
20; Fish, Stanley, 'Boutique Multiculturalism,' in Arthur M. Melzer, Jerry W. Weinberger & M. Richard 
Zinman (eds.), Multiculturalism and American Democracy (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 
pp. 69, 73; Kymlicka, Finding Our Way, pp. 58-9. 
44 Kymlicka, The Rights of Minority Cultures, pp. 8-9. 
45 Kymlicka, Finding Our Way, p.20; Kallen, Horace M., 'Democracy Versus the Melting Pot,' in Culture 
and Democracy in the United States: Studies in the Group Psychology of the American Peoples (New 
York: Boni and Liveright, 1924), p. 122. 
46 Fuchs, Lawrence, The American Kaleidoscope: Race, Ethnicity and the Civic Culture (Hanover, NH & 
London: Wesleyan University Press, 1990); Smith, Rogers M., Civic Ideals : Conflicting Visions of 
Citizenship in U.S. History (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997). 
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 The upshot of this discussion is that there is a great difference between a 
communitarian multiculturalism of discrete ethnic groups, and a cosmopolitan 
multiculturalism of hybridised individuals. The latter preserves ethnic cultures and their 
national containers, but not ethnic boundaries - or, by extension, ethnic communities.  
 
The Challenge of Ethnic Myths and Symbols 
 
Ethnic boundary symbols, despite their power, constitute a mere subset of a much larger 
complex of symbols, myths, images and historical narratives that some have called the 
ethnic mythomoteur. The mythomoteur of an ethnic group thus includes not only the 
group's symbolic boundary criteria, but all the elements of its Weberian 'ideal type.' This 
is a culture complex which no one member, past or present, male or female, could ever 
hope to fulfil. For instance, a Caucasian phenotype, Protestantism and the Afrikaans 
language are boundary symbols of Afrikaner identity. However, living a rural lifestyle, 
playing rugby, participating in nachtsmaal and consuming bok are not boundary markers 
- though these items form part of the ethnic mythomoteur that differentiates Afrikaaners 
from other ethnic groups.  
 Similarly, in mythic terms, ethnic groups are wedded to particular ethno-histories 
(oral or written), which tell stories about the group's origin, travails and golden age, just 
as its 'ethnic maps' outline the group's homeland in all its poetic contours.47 Over time, 
particular stories and figures come to be welded together into a single gestalt.48 Think of 
the Greeks' fusion of classical, Byzantine and independence myths, or the Japanese, with 
their blend of medieval Samurai mythology, Shintoism and post-Meiji national history. In 
both the symbolic and mythic cases, there appears a synergy between members' activities 
and intellectuals' (selective) ethnic interpretation. In this sense, ethnicity manifests a drive 
towards selection, particularity and differentiation. 
 The problem for liberalism, at least in its Rawlsian guise, is that the ethnic drive 
toward differentiation results in symbolic inequality between those who possess many 
                                                          
47 Smith, Ethnic Origins of Nations, ch. 8. 
48 Psychology term referring to the existence of a phenomenological unity - such as discrete colours. As 
regards its application to ethnicity and nations, see Hutchinson, John, The Dynamics of Cultural 
Nationalism. 
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ethnic traits and those who possess (or subscribe to) fewer. A French woman with an 
Italian surname might feel less French, a Jew who does not believe in the Masada myth 
less Jewish, a non-Welsh-speaker less Welsh, an Italian who dislikes Italian food less 
Italian, and so on. The more symbols that ethnicity values as distinctive, the greater the 
possibility of symbolic inequality  - particularly with respect to new entrants. 
 The liberal pressure, in this case, is for ethnicity to redefine itself in ever more 
inclusive terms so as to minimise the alienation of those with low ethnic capital and ease 
the acceptance of new entrants into the group. For instance, secular, converted or 
intermarried Sikhs would like to redefine their group mythomoteur in a thinner way so as 
to minimise their estrangement from the group ideal-type. The problem for ethnicity, 
however, arises when liberal pressure to strip the mythomoteur of offending elements 
contributes to a thinning or universalisation of the ethnic group, thereby diminishing its 
distinctiveness.  
Liberal culturalists have overwhelmingly responded to the challenge of mytho-
symbolic differentiation by declaring that mythomoteurs are flexible, evolving entities 
that can always accommodate change in their content. This argument has been strongly 
elaborated by Chandran Kukathas, who argues that ethnic groups are 'mutable historical 
formations-associations of individuals.' Their symbolic content is thus 'constantly 
forming and dissolving.'49 And, as Alan Patten notes, '[Yael] Tamir, [David] Miller, 
[Joseph] Raz and [Will] Kymlicka all take pains to emphasise that changes in the 
character of a community are consistent with the continuity of a rich and healthy cultural 
structure….'50  
                                                          
49 Kukathas, Chandran, 'Are There Any Cultural Rights,' in Kymlicka, W. (ed.), The Rights of Minority 
Cultures, pp. 232-4. 
50 Patten, Alan, 'The Autonomy Argument for Liberal Nationalism,' Nations and Nationalism, vol.5, part 1 
(1999), p. 9, emphasis added; Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, pp. 48-53; Miller, David, On Nationality 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 127. 
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First of all, it should be noted that these liberal nationalist authors are all 
subscribing to a highly constructivist interpretation of ethnic behaviour that is extremely 
contentious in empirical terms.51 More important, what these liberal communitarians fail 
to appreciate is that while ethnic symbolism has historically evolved and changed 
(somewhat), this does not mean that ethnic group members were open to change. 
Typically, where change has occurred, this has been the result of an unforeseen shock 
brought about by conquest or elite diktat. Changes of religious markers are one example. 
The Christianisation of Europe, the Islamisation of North Africa and parts of South Asia - 
these events were not foreseeable and usually swept across all the ethnic groups in their 
path. Thus they did not alter neighbours' ethnic differentiae. In some cases, i.e. pagan 
Chazars into Jews, Bosnian Bogomils into Muslims, key ethnic markers were affected. 
However, these were exceptions, and occurred in an age when ethnic groups were often 
only loosely integrated, if at all.  
Moreover, at the time, the institutional sinews of collective memory were weak 
enough to permit a great deal of collective amnesia. When one's history is orally 
transmitted and society hierarchical, changes can easily be recast as ancient traditions or 
eternal truths. Yet in the modern age of institutional reflexivity - an age of videotape, 
DNA tests, newspapers and computer databases - the capacity for groups to credibly 
believe that recent cultural changes are time-honoured traditions has been markedly 
diminished.52 
                                                          
51 A sample of the debate between 'instrumentalists,' who view ethnicity as constructed for political and 
economic gain, 'ethno-symbolists,' who treat it as a cultural-historical force, and 'primordialists,' who 
consider it a pre-cultural, biological drive, is provided in Smith, A.D. and Hutchinson, J. (eds.), Ethnicity, 
part II. 
52 Giddens, Anthony, Modernity and Self-Identity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), pp. 20-21, 149. 
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The lengthening of society's time horizons has been accompanied by an attendant 
expansion of cognitive space. Hence, for the great number of individuals whose horizons 
have expanded with global communications and capitalism, cultural options from the 
outside world become easily identifiable as foreign in origin. An English word like 
'television,' even if borrowed, as in the Japanese 'terebi,' remains identifiably English, 
where once it might have been passed off as an authentic Japanese inheritance going back 
into the mists of time. In a modern, reflexive age, therefore, symbolic changes become 
much more problematic as the 'scope for invention' narrows.53  
The point here is that ethnic groups have not been, and do not wish to be, 
'cosmopolitan, and embrace…cultural interchange….'54 Change has been thrust upon 
them in times of stress, and that change has often involved symbols that were not key 
boundary markers, and which rapidly became hallowed by tradition. The dominant 
outlook, therefore, has been communitarian, not cosmopolitan. Today, cultural change 
cannot be so easily forgotten, and this means that ethnic behaviour will translate into a 
more (not less) strident protection of the cultural content of the group's mythomoteur. 
This is especially true for the subset of symbols, often language, religion, territory and 
sometimes race, which are widely viewed as central to group identity.   
                                                          
53 The question of the scope for invention is treated in Zimmer, Oliver, 'Competing Visions of the Nation: 
Liberal Historians and the Reconstruction of the Swiss Past, 1870-1900', forthcoming in Past and Present, 
August, 2000. 
54 Kymlicka, The Rights of Minority Cultures, p.8. 
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This is not to say that cultural change is impossible in modernity. However, it 
typically involves either a change of symbolic emphasis or the addition of new 
differentiae to the historical stock. The elimination of core symbols (a process upon 
which the constructivist argument relies) is much more difficult than the creation of new 
ones. Turkish ethnicity, for example, has come to focus on Anatolia as a homeland. Yet 
this does not mean that the idea of a mythical, central Asian 'Turan' has been lost as a 
group symbol.55 Likewise, Quebec's Quiet Revolution did not result in the ejection of the 
rural habitant or Catholicism as symbols of Quebecois ethnicity - these remain important 
ethnic symbols, even though they are not central to the nationalist project. In these cases, 
and in many others, the traditional content of the ethnic mythomoteur remains 
unchanged, even as the accent is placed on different symbols and some modern 
differentiae added. This suggests that cultural change is strongly constrained by historical 
parameters. There thus appears to be little evidence that large-scale, 'cosmopolitan' 
borrowing is occurring at the level of ethnic mythomoteurs. 
What is occurring is a division between cosmopolitanism (usually in the guise of 
westernisation) and ethnicity, between those who wish to yield ethnic particularity so as 
to accommodate a measure of liberalism and western culture, and those who wish to 
resist these influences. Ethnic fundamentalists tend to be in the minority, but the 
hybridised majority are not under any illusions that Michael Jackson or Coca-Cola are 
ethnic symbols. Such individuals have come to an accommodation between foreign and 
native influences, and their spokespeople wish to do the same.  
                                                          
55 Smith, Ethnic Origins of Nations, p. 134. In the Turkish case, the Turanic idea persists in the form of 
pan-Turkic ties to post-Soviet successor states in central Asia. 
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Now, I don't wish to suggest that synthesis between ethnicity and liberalism 
cannot occur - this is something I shall return to later. At this point, I merely wish to 
underscore the idea that cultural borrowing has become much more problematic because 
ethnic groups' capacity for amnesia and isolation have been progressively eroded by 
modernity.56 This means that, pace current liberal communitarian thinking, cultural 
content counts. Whether it be the struggle for a historic Estonian territory, the defence of 
the French language, the assertion of a dominant Hindu religion, or the blood-quantum 
rule to protect the Canadian aboriginal phenotype, today's ethnic struggles invariably 
involve particular cultural markers. Tamir, Miller, Kymlicka and Raz acknowledge as 
much when they defend the right of ethnic groups who are fighting nationalist struggles 
to protect particular cultural symbols from decline.57  
Overall then, in terms of their prescriptive views of the good life, most liberal 
communitarians embrace a cosmopolitan perspective on cultural change - one distinctly 
at odds with ethnic practice. Taken at once, it is difficult to see how their liberal approach 
to both ethnic boundaries and mythomoteurs can defend against the erosion of actual 
cultural structures. As Seglow remarks with respect to Will Kymlicka's work, 
 
Perhaps national cultures are merely loose assemblages of options…But, if so, it 
is unclear what meaning there is to the cultural structure existing over and above 
these options. For, unless it is, in some sense, substantive it is unclear how there 
can be a cultural structure which is vulnerable or viable. It is also unclear how an 
aggregate of options can provide the orientation which culture is supposed to 
give.58  
 
                                                          
56 This argument, related to the rise of ‘scientific’ history, may be found in Plumb, J.H. The Death of the 
Past (London: Macmillan, 1969), and Kennedy, P.M. "The Decline of Nationalistic History in the West, 
1900-1970," Journal of Contemporary History, no. 8 , pp. 77-100, 1977. A counterargument is that of 
Anthony Giddens, who contends that high modernity leads to a compression of individuals’ time horizon, 
and hence greater mytho-symbolic amnesia. See Giddens' discussion in Modernity and Self-Identity. I 
would point out that this potential mass amnesia (due to information overload) cannot translate into 
collective amnesia without the consent of symbolic ‘experts’ in the scientific and journalistic communities. 
These specialists (collectively) are not overwhelmed by information mass, and their training and 
information retrieval capacities endow them with an enhanced power to debunk myths that lack empirical 
plausibility.  
57 Patten, Alan, 'The Autonomy Argument for Liberal Nationalism,' p. 9.  
58 Seglow, Jonathan, 'Universals and Particulars: the Case of Liberal Cultural Nationalism,' Political 
Studies, XLIV (1998), p. 969. 
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Ancestry and Race as Ethnic Symbols 
 
The problems that ethnic boundaries and mythomoteurs pose for liberals are also 
related to ancestry and race. These can act both as ethnic boundary symbols (ie. 
American blacks, white Rhodesians) or constitute a less integral part of a group's 
mythomoteur (ie. Jews' descent from Abraham). For liberal culturalists and liberal 
nationalists alike, ancestry and race clearly have no constructive role to play in modern 
liberal theory. For, as Kymlicka writes: 
 
Descent-based approaches to national membership have obvious racist overtones, 
and are manifestly unjust. It is indeed one of the tests of a liberal conception of 
minority rights that it defines national membership in terms of integration into a 
cultural community, rather than descent…Membership in an ethnic group is not 
something fixed at birth by one's genes: it is a matter of socialisation into, and 
identification with, a way of life - a sense of membership and belonging in a 
historical community.59  
 
Here again, we must return to an earlier point: if ethnicity is not about shared ancestry, 
why the need to specify that 'ethnocultural' groups and 'polyethnicity' do not involve 
'ethnic descent.' The problem is that Kymlicka is trying to square a circle. He knows that 
the empirical record shows an extremely close relationship between (putative) descent 
and what we understand as ethnicity, yet his liberal convictions will not allow him to 
endorse this definition of the term. In practice, however, he, along with other liberal 
culturalists, defends actual descent-based ethnic movements against the universalism of 
societies where descent is a less significant principle of social organisation. In this 
manner he is endorsing the practical advancement of the very principle (descent) that he 
abhors. 
                                                          
59 Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 225; Kymlicka, 
Multicultural Citizenship, pp. 22-4, 125; Kymlicka, Finding Our Way, p. 95. 
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 With respect to race, a similar conundrum prevails. There are examples of trans-
racial ethnicity (ie. Cape Coloureds, Mauretanian Moors, and, to a lesser extent, Jews, 
Latin Americans and Arabs), but, generally speaking, where long-distance migration has 
brought physically identifiable groups together, race has been used as an ethnic marker.60 
In many cases (ie. Afrikaaners and Xhosa, Malays and Chinese, Hawaiians and Haoles61, 
Caribbean Blacks and Whites), phenotype serves as a central symbol. To circumscribe its 
use could pose a threat to the survival of such groups. Yet, once again, to endorse the 
movements of any of these groups against a more universalist alternative grants 
legitimacy to the use of race as an ethnic symbol. It follows, therefore, that to be 
consistent with liberal principles, Kymlicka's liberal culturalism must sacrifice its defense 
of contemporary ethnicity in many contexts. 
 Liberal nationalists like David Miller and Yael Tamir have espoused similar 
principles to those of Kymlicka with respect to race and descent. Miller, for example, is 
at pains to stress that a national identity based on 'biological descent, that our fellow-
nationals must be our 'kith and kin,' [is] a view that leads directly to racism.'62 Tamir is 
perhaps less clear on this point, but she makes it evident that subjectively-defined, highly 
voluntaristic nations are distinct from 'peoples,' which may be objectively defined in 
racial or genealogical terms. Tamir also remarks that liberal nationalism is 'mainly 
characterised by the features [Hans] Kohn had assigned to the western nationalism 
modeled on the Enlightenment…[namely, that it is]…pluralistic and open.'63 
                                                          
60 Van den Berghe, Pierre, 'Does Race Matter?,' Nations and Nationalism, vol.1, part 3 (1995), pp. 359-68; 
Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, pp. 41-5.  
61 Hawaiian phrase referring to a white American. 
62 Miller, On Nationality, p. 25. 
63 Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, pp. 65-6, 83. 
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 In principle, there need be nothing inconsistent about liberal nationalists' 
insistence that nations are not defined by ancestry or race. So long as liberal nationalists 
do not pretend to defend ethnicity, there are few problems. The practical issue, of course, 
arises due to the link between ethnic groups and nations. Most nations were formed on 
the basis of ethnic antecedents, and this connection makes it difficult to construct a 
national project that won't alienate ethnic minorities.64 This means that liberal nationalist 
projects will provoke a symbolic conflict unless they thin their symbolic repertoire down 
to a bare set of ethical and constitutional essentials.65 Even here, any hint of a connection 
between particular national tenets and a dominant descent group may set off struggles for 
recognition rooted in symbolic self-esteem and ethnic status.66 This in turn creates an 
ethical challenge which liberal nationalism can only answer by either privileging national 
culture (which betrays liberalism) or abandoning its particularistic elements (thereby 
neutralising nationalism). 
In a related way, most minority nationalisms draw on the ethnic sentiments of a 
particular primary ethnic group. The liberal nationalism of Scotland, for instance, leans 
heavily on the support of Scots Protestants, Catalonian nationalism on ethnic Catalans 
and Quebec nationalism on pure laine Quebecois.67 A corollary of this is that purely 
state-based nationalisms, whether in imperial Europe in the nineteenth century, or in post-
colonial Africa in the twentieth, have generally failed to supplant sub-state ethnic 
loyalties.68 Even in the post-modern west, ethnic identity and national fervour are 
correlated, as with the prominence of those of British ancestry in patriotic societies like 
the Daughters of the American Revolution or the various Legions in Britain, the United 
States, Canada and Australasia. Hence liberal nationalists must choose between endorsing 
successful nationalisms (which appeal to ethnic sentiment) or a thoroughgoing liberalism 
in which nationality remains weak.  
                                                          
64 Smith, National Identity, p. 39; Horowitz, Donald, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, ch. 5. 
65 This position constitutes the essence of Jurgen Habermas' constitutional patriotism. See Habermas, 
Jurgen. 'Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe,' Praxis International, 
12 (1992-3), pp. 1-19. A similar argument may be found in Mason, Andy, 'Political Community, Liberal-
Nationalism, and the Ethics of Assimilation,' Ethics 109 (Jan 1999),pp. 261-86. 
66 Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, pp. 216-17; Taylor, Multiculturalism and the Politics of 
Recognition, p. 25. 
67 On the Quebecois, see Kymlicka, Finding Our Way, p. 96; for discussion of Protestant support for the 
SNP, see McFarland, Elaine, Protestants First: Orangeism in Nineteenth Century Scotland (Edinburgh: 
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Ancestry and race. The ubiquitous presence of these symbols as ethnic markers 
casts the arguments of both liberal culturalism and liberal nationalism into shadow. 
Without admitting these symbols into its pantheon, liberal culturalism cannot logically 
uphold its commitment to ethnic movements and liberal nationalism cannot defend any 
practical nationalist project. There is no better illustration of this dilemma than the 
phenomenon of national ethnicity, which occupies the no man's land between liberal 
culturalism and liberal nationalism. 
  
National Ethnicity 
 
Liberals often align themselves with national demands raised by 'underdogs,' be 
they indigenous peoples, discriminated minorities, or occupied nations, whose 
plight can easily evoke sympathy. But if national claims rest on theoretically 
sound and morally justified grounds, one cannot restrict their application: They 
apply equally to all nations, regardless of their power, their wealth, their history of 
suffering, or even the injustices they have inflicted on others in the past.69  
 
Tamir's argument is surely sound, and his been ratified by Will Kymlicka, among 
others, in his criticism of Charles Taylor.70 The question that remains, however, is what 
to do with nations that are also ethnic groups. On this note, several commentators have 
acerbically remarked that it is far easier to empathise with 'cuddly minorities' than 
dominant ethnic groups.71 As a result, liberal communitarians tend to evince discomfort 
with national ethnicity.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
Edinburgh University Press, 1990), p. 217; McCrone, David, Understanding Scotland: the Sociology of a 
Stateless Nation (London: Routledge, 1992). 
68 Smith, National Identity, pp. 115-16; Emerson, Rupert 'Nation-Building in Africa,' in Karl W. Deutsch 
and William J. Foltz (ed), Nation-Building (New York, NY: Atherton Press, 1963). 
69 Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, p. 11. 
70 Kymlicka, 'The Sources of Nationalism: Commentary on Taylor,' p. 63; Lichtenberg, Judith, 'Nationalism 
For, and (Mainly) Against,' in Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan (eds.), The Morality of Nationalism (New 
York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 171. 
71 Goodin, Robert E., review of Kymlicka, 'The Rights of Minority Cultures,' Ethics (January 1997), p.357; 
Bauman, Zygmunt, 'Communitarianism, Freedom, and the Nation-State,' Critical Review 9, no. 4 (Fall 
1995), p. 551. 
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National ethnicity is a concept which has, to my knowledge, never been used. It is 
not identical to the term dominant ethnicity,72 because dominant groups need not be 
national in extent (ie. Afrikaners in apartheid South Africa, whites in pre-1980 Rhodesia, 
Alawis in Syria). National ethnicity, by contrast, refers to primary ethnic groups which 
have become nations (whether these possess states is irrelevant). In other words, national 
ethnic groups are indigenous ethnic groups which have established nations (integrated 
communities of territory, political history, mass culture and mutual obligation) in their 
ethnic homeland during the modern period. Catalans in Catalonia, Melanesian Fijians in 
Fiji, the French in France, the Japanese in Japan - all are national ethnic groups. 
Examining the map of the world, one finds that while there are essentially no 
mono-ethnic states, most states have an ethnic majority. Even in 1971, prior to eighteen 
successful post-1989 secessions, nearly three quarters of states had an ethnic majority 
group while in roughly half of the world's states, the majority group made up at least 75 
percent of the population.73 This is no statistical coincidence. If we exclude the former 
USSR, former Yugoslavia, and the special case of the African continent, the homogeneity 
of the world's nations, and the coincidence between ethnicity and nationalism, becomes 
strikingly evident.  
Michael Walzer makes the point that only in imperial cities was 'space measured 
to an individual fit.' Everyone else in the empire lived in homogenous territorial units or 
urban districts.74 This situation remains true today. Were we to break the world map 
down to the level of territorial nations, stateless or otherwise, we would find that very 
few parts of the world are 'deeply diverse' in the non-territorial, western sense. Hence 
national ethnicity may be considered a remarkably ubiquitous phenomenon, even though 
the 'purity' of such national ethnic realms is never perfect.  
                                                          
72 Refers to the politically and economically dominant ethnic group in a state. See Kaufmann, Eric, 
'Dominant Ethnicity,' in The Encyclopedia of Nationalism (London: Transaction Publishers, 1999); Doane, 
Ashley W., Jr. 'Dominant Group Ethnic Identity in the United States: The Role of 'Hidden' Ethnicity in 
Intergroup Relations,' Sociological Quarterly, 38, 3 (1997), pp. 375-397. 
73 Connor, Walker, 'A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group, is a ...,' in Hutchinson and Smith 
(eds.), Nationalism, pp. 214-215. 
74 Walzer, Michael, 'The Politics of Difference: Statehood and Toleration in a Multicultural World,' in 
Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan (eds.), The Morality of Nationalism (New York/Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), pp. 247-8. 
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Why the link between ethnic group and nation? There are two reasons. First of all, 
primary ethnic groups (and even secondary ones like the Jews, Greeks and Armenians in 
the diaspora) often seek to become nations. The result, according to Anthony Smith, is 
that, 'Though most latter-day nations are, in fact, polyethnic…many have been formed in 
the first place around a dominant ethnie, which annexed or attracted other ethnies or 
ethnic fragments into the state to which it gave a name and cultural charter.'75  
Even in cases where state precedes nation, the state seeks to develop cultural 
solidarity within its population. Hence Francis comments that 'national movements have 
a tendency to reinterpret demotic [political] unity in ethnic terms in order to provide 
added legitimacy and sentimental support.' The endpoint of this thinking is national 
ethnogenesis, as in Mexico with the rise of the mestizo myth of genealogical ancestry 
during 1892-1917.76 Notice that the ethnic character of national ethnic groups continues 
to persist, in the form of ethno-nationalist revival, even after a state has been obtained. 
What is surprising about national ethnicity, however, is that despite its ubiquitous 
presence on the world scene, it has not been adequately treated in either the social science 
or political theory literature. Liberal culturalist thought, for example, has carved out 
space for the politico-cultural claims of minority cultures vis à vis the majority. In a 
similar vein, liberal nationalism has argued the case for a majority politico-cultural 
nationalism of the gesellschaft variety.77 
One is tempted to ask, however, how liberals would view national groups that 
wish to go beyond politics and culture, that is, nations which wish to remain ethnic in 
terms of their boundaries and the content of their mythomoteur. In other words, once all 
ethno-nationalist claims have been settled, where is the space in political theory for 
ethnicity? The answer appears to be the same cosmopolitan one suggested by the 
American Liberal Progressives in the 1910's: ethnic groups shall either transmute into 
                                                          
75 Smith, National Identity, p. 39. 
76 Francis, E.K., Interethnic Relations, p.348. 
77 I refer to the difference between the abstract society of gesselschaft, where social ties are rational and 
instrumental, and the personal, affective and irrational ties of the local village gemeinscaft. See Tönnies, 
Ferdinand, Community & Society : Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (East Lansing : Michigan State 
University Press, [1908] 1957) for the original exposition of this idea. Ethnic ties may be considered a 
transmutation of the gemeinschaft principle, described by Max Weber as gemeinsamkeit. Weber, 'The 
Origin of Ethnic Groups,' p. 35. 
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culturally neutral nation-states or integrate into them, losing their attachment (over 
several generations) to particular ethnic boundaries and specific myths and symbols.  
 
The Current State of Synthesis 
 
The argument advanced thus far suggests that liberal communitarians have yet to devise a 
framework for the good life which synthesises liberalism with ethnic community. Their 
views are imperfectly liberal - because of liberal nationalists' advocacy of state-
sanctioned nationality - and are insufficiently communitarian, owing to their disapproval 
of the four practices of ethnic community detailed thus far. Even so, one should not take 
the foregoing to mean that the efforts of these theorists have come to naught, for several 
important syntheses have been made. 
 The first such milestone arrived with the advent of the modern nation-state during 
the French Revolution. By abolishing the hierarchical system of the ancien regime and 
replacing the king with the free community as the focus of the polity, the French 
Revolution produced a larger measure of both community and liberty. The next important 
development transpired through the work of Herder, who, in contrast to contemporaries 
like Hegel and Fichte, advocated a world of free, unitary and authentic nations which 
respect each other's organic particularity. This 'polycentric' scheme of equal respect 
between peoples represented an advance over 'ethnocentric' models which stressed 
themes of divine election, superiority and conquest.78  
 In Herder, we find a defense of communal particularity coupled with the liberal 
advocacy of inter-ethnic respect - a gain for both principles of liberal community. What is 
missing in Herder's approach, though, is any space for those within the territorial and 
genealogical community who wish not to identify with the ethnic nation. There is also no 
room for non-territorial ethnic minorities to exist in the Herderian social atmosphere.  
Herderian polycentrism went on to influence Horace Kallen, one of the first 
prophets of multiculturalism, during the First World War. Kallen believed that mutual 
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respect between nations (and federated ethnic groups in the United States) would lead to 
an international, cosmopolitan worldview - all the while maintaining ethnic boundaries. 
However, while Kallen's ideas provide more scope for cosmopolitanism than Herder's 
and allow non-territorial ethnic minorities to flourish in the United States, they fail to 
carve out much space for the uncommitted individual.79  
In the period since Kallen wrote, a liberal-cosmopolitan consensus based upon the 
contradictions of Liberal Progressive thought has reigned among many.80 Unfortunately, 
this has frustrated the progress of political theory by offering too many loopholes for 
theorists to thread their arguments through. Yet there are bright spots in the lining of this 
gray cloud. One conceptual development is Will Kymlicka's contention that ethnic and 
national groups can enlarge the array of meaningful choices a liberal individual can 
have.81 Here the aim of ethno-cultural community and liberty are both advanced - so long 
as most liberal individuals choose to identify with their group. Charles Taylor's dictum 
that a recognised ethno-cultural identity can reinforce individuals' self-esteem similarly 
advances the cause of both liberalism and community. Once again, though, the problem 
of non-identifiers muddies the waters somewhat.82  
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The work of Yael Tamir is of similar importance to that of Taylor and Kymlicka, 
for it fuses the cultural nationalism of Herder and Kallen with the inclusive liberalism of 
Hans Kohn, Alfred Cobban and the post-WWII civic nationalist school.83 Tamir thereby 
opens up the ethnic boundary to outsiders, without abolishing it. Finally, David Miller's 
contribution to liberal nationalism, which highlights the role of the nation in reinforcing 
the structures of trust which sustain liberalism, is also noteworthy in that it renders the 
aims of liberalism and communitarianism congruent.84  
 Unfortunately, what is evident in these recent syntheses of liberalism and 
community is that the marginal gains to both Goods have been falling. Worse, liberal-
communitarians now appear boxed in: communitarian ground can only be taken by 
yielding liberal territory or withdrawing to the heights of impracticality (i.e. content-free 
ethnicity and nationalism.) This suggests that liberal culturalism and liberal nationalism 
are now serving as currents of intellectual refinement, but are falling short of a 
conceptual breakthrough. 
 
Toward Liberal Ethnicity 
 
 Our quest for a significant synthesis of liberalism and ethnicity must begin with a 
realistic portrait of ethnic community, and it must seek its solutions within the complexity 
of ethnicity, not above it. This can best be achieved by challenging the following four 
ethnic precepts which lie at liberalism's communitarian frontier: 
 
1) Symbolic boundary-maintenance 
2) Exclusive, inflexible and thick ethnic mythomoteurs 
3) The use of ancestry and race as group boundary markers 
4) The desire among national groups to revive or maintain their ethnicity 
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Taking all four of these ideas at once, we find that they may be reduced to a discussion of 
two simple concepts: core and boundary. Thus ethnic communities can be divided into a 
symbolic core (or mythomoteur), and a symbolic boundary. At the core lies the 
intersection of the values of those variables (ie. religion, language, myths, phenotype, 
material culture) which constitute the group's ideal-type. By contrast, at the boundary lie 
the maximal points of variation from the ideal-type that are permissible before an 
individual is no longer considered to be a member. A great deal of variation is usually 
allowed on most ethnic traits, but for boundary traits, there is often little or no variation 
permitted. Such boundary traits tend always to include genealogy, and often include race. 
 The question here is: how distinct from the ideal type can an individual be before 
she is no longer considered to be part of the group. The answer is completely subjective, 
and depends upon the inclusiveness of the group. Throughout history, ethnic groups have 
tended to maintain relatively strict boundary criteria - though seldom as strict as those 
employed in the stereotypes of foreign observers. Germans with Polish surnames, 
Alsatian-speaking Frenchmen, and Palestinian Christians are all non-ideal-type ethnics 
who have nevertheless (usually) managed to satisfy boundary criteria. By contrast, 
Germans of the Jewish faith, Anglo-Americans of mixed race and Armenians of the 
Muslim faith have typically failed to do so. The constitution of boundary types, or 
barrriers to entry, is the weak spot of ethnicity that we have been searching for, and is 
clearly ripe for liberal reform. 
 
The Liberal-Ethnic Synthesis 
 
 The preceding discussion has established that the cultural imperative behind 
ethnicity seeks to increase the symbolic density of its ideal-type. However, we also know 
that symbolic density leads to the alienation of those who do not fit such criteria. In order 
to surmount this conundrum, what is required is not the reduction of the ideal-type down 
to its most abstract, inclusive symbols, as current liberal theory requires. Instead, it is the 
boundary-type, or entry criteria, which must be thinned to a minimum. To dismantle 
barriers to ethnic membership while continuing to invest in the symbolic accumulation of 
the ideal-type is an excellent solution to the liberal-ethnic dilemma. This substantive 
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model thereby represents a synthesis which promises to renew ethnic vitality while 
upholding the tenets of liberty and equality.  
 Let us flesh out the idea of liberal ethnicity. Like traditional ethnics, liberal 
ethnics would seek to expand the symbolic content of their ideal-type, celebrate its 
distinctiveness through cultural expression and make use of their myths and symbols as 
an organizing principle for communal life. On the other hand, liberal ethnicity would 
differ from traditional ethnicity in several important respects: 
 
Ethnic Boundaries 
 
Barriers to entry would be minimal, thereby facilitating the entry and assimilation of 
those who wish to subscribe to the group's culture, ethno-history and identity. There is 
one caveat, however. Namely, that while entry criteria will be virtually non-existent, 
ethnic boundaries will be maintained at the symbolic level, and these boundaries will 
include ancestry and possibly phenotype. Now, it may seem difficult to apprehend the 
difference between barriers to entry and symbolic boundaries, but the difference is 
significant. Barriers to entry rely on absolute ethnic boundary criteria (ie. no Muslim can 
be a Sikh, no black can be a Rhodesian). Symbolic boundaries simply privilege particular 
symbols within the mythomoteur, ie. a defining symbol of the Sikh ethnic group is the 
Sikh faith, a defining symbol of Rhodesian identity is the Caucasian phenotype.  
 In many situations, liberalism and ethnicity will be able to interweave seamlessly 
among each other. In other words, there will be some demand from Muslims or non-
whites for entry into the Sikh or Rhodesian ethnies, which will be granted, yet the 
symbolic boundaries of religion and race will remain unaffected. Of course, there may 
come a point when entry barriers will need to be pressed into the service of maintaining 
credible ethnic boundaries. It is only when this point is reached that hard choices between 
the 'mutually incompatible and incommensurable'85 goods of liberty and community will 
have to be made.  
In the case of a real threat to symbolic boundaries (one thinks of the case of the 
Welsh with regard to language or many Native American tribes with regard to culture and 
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phenotype), barriers to entry could form part of a liberal-ethnic project. The seriousness 
of any particular threat could be determined by an internationally-agreed standard which 
examined the magnitude of such threats based on factors like the rate of symbolic or 
demographic decline. A firm threshold for boundary loss would need to inform liberals' 
views on this matter. For example, as the proportion of those who speak the language 
falls below x per cent of the ethnic group's population, or if the proportion identifying 
with the ethnic religion falls below x per cent, stronger barriers to entry for newcomers 
would be tolerated. Such barriers would not be absolute (ie. no non-Welsh speakers), but 
circumscribed (ie. no more non-Welsh speakers until x condition returns). 
This perspective would take some account of the past significance of particular 
symbols to the group involved, but would generally hold groups to a common standard. 
In this manner, perceived threats not supported by evidence (such as the apartheid-era 
Afrikaners with regard to their 'threatened' racial identity or pre-war Sudeten Germans 
with respect to their 'threatened' culture) would offer no justification for erecting barriers 
to entry. Furthermore, a liberal ethnic perspective must affirm the primacy of the basic 
rights of the individual, including a right to culture. Hence, under no circumstances 
should barriers to entry take the form of threats to basic liberties, for if a community 
cannot survive without breaching core liberal tenets, no liberal should support its 
survival.  
 
Ancestry and Race 
 
 Related to the preceding discussion about barriers to entry is the importance of 
ancestry and race as ethnic boundary symbols. Contrary to what most liberal 
communitarians espouse, there need be nothing illiberal about this, so long as barriers to 
entry are not predicated upon the idea of maintaining a genealogically or racially 'pure' 
group. Indeed, the danger of racial and genealogical thinking lies not in the maintenance 
of racial and ethnic particularity, but in the insistence on purity, which breeds intolerance, 
racist inequality, and, at worst, ethnic cleansing and genocide.  
Once again, this problem can be surmounted by eliminating absolute barriers to 
entry. With respect to race, for instance, a Chinese individual trying to join the 
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Norwegian ethnic group would be admitted, even as the racial boundary symbol of 
Norwegian ethnicity remains in place. Only if the magnitude of new entrants became 
such as to credibly threaten this symbol of Norwegian identity would ethnic Norwegians 
be justified in controlling entry. In addition, this would have to take the form of a 
qualified, quantitative restriction (ie. no more newcomers until x condition is met), rather 
than absolute restriction (ie. no non-whites) so as to respect the cultural rights of the 
prospective entrants. 
 In terms of genealogy, a related situation would obtain. Thus we could imagine an 
individual of Irish ancestry joining the Jewish ethnic group or a Moroccan Arab joining 
the French ethnic group. This would come about as the Irishman or Moroccan takes on 
the history, culture, and, (this is a critical difference between liberal ethnicity and liberal 
nationalism) the myth of genealogical descent of the Jews and French. One might ask: 
how can someone who is of Irish descent adopt a belief in his descent from Abraham and 
the tribes of Israel. The answer is that the Irishman will be joining the lineage that 
(supposedly) emanates from Abraham. This means that he will envision his genealogical 
destiny as lying, at least in part, with the Jewish ethnic group. The same holds for the 
Moroccan and his orientation toward Vercingetorix and the Gauls, or Clovis and the 
Franks. Without the genealogical commitment, the Irishman or Moroccan could never 
take on a new ethnic identity, though they could remain solid members of the Israeli or 
French civic nations. 
 Naturally, entry criteria must still exist so that members of an ethnic group can 
identify each other. However, the liberal ethnic outlook would insist that these criteria be 
of an easily acquired nature. Attitudes, language, lifestyle, dress, or other cues, for 
example. Once again, no discrimination on the basis of ethnic capital can be tolerated in 
daily interaction among members. As a consequence of this egalitarianism, the symbolic 
boundaries of the ethnic community - even if these include race and descent - will 
continue to be reinforced as the descendants of new entrants readily assimilate to the 
central values of their new ethnic group. 
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Mythomoteurs 
 
 Another key difference between traditional and liberal ethnicity concerns the 
status of an ethnic group's mythomoteur, or mytho-symbolic ideal-type. This would serve 
as a beacon, or resource for identity rather than as a source of exclusive membership. No 
hierarchy should be erected which discriminates against those who share fewer ideal-
typical ethnic traits. Accordingly, the liberal ethnic ideal envisions members of the ethnic 
group possessing multiple social identities, and constituting their self-identity by 
selecting elements from the group's ideal-typical symbolic archive. For some group 
members, ethnicity will be their most salient identity, for others, this will not be the case.  
Furthermore, the liberal ethnic weltanschauung would wish to see an ethnic 
group's historical narrative remain faithful to scientific truth, with the proviso that the 
scientist's default position of doubt would be replaced by a stance of cautious affirmation. 
However, should science turn up evidence that elements of the group's narrative are, with 
high probability, based on false beliefs, ethnic intellectuals would discard these beliefs or 
accept them as creative, but untruthful forms of communal expression. 
Naturally, the notion of liberal ethnicity also rejects the ethnocentrism that has 
traditionally pervaded the outlook of ethnic groups, in favour of the polycentric 
perspective expounded by pluralistic nationalists like Herder and Mazzini.86 Rather than 
ascribing superiority to the in-group and inferiority to Other, liberal ethnicity would treat 
all groups as equal, even as it draws qualitative distinctions between them. A 
reconstructed ethnicity would also seek to mediate between modern and traditional forms, 
rather than rejecting modern/exotic influences outright. In this manner, liberal ethnic 
groups would seek to encourage a lively debate between revivalists and modernisers 
within their ranks.87 Moreover, they would respect the choice of individuals not to be 
ethnic. The competition between trans-ethnic 'lifestyle' subcultures and ethnic 
communities would sharpen the identities of both entities, arguably leading to a 
revitalisation of both. 
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National Ethnicity 
                                                                                                                                              
A corollary of the previous positions is that 'homeland' (national) ethnicity is no less 
legitimate than diasporan (transnational) ethnicity. Indeed, contrary to what some 
theorists of globalisation imply, 88 transnational ethnicity would not survive for long in a 
world shorn of ethnic homelands.89 For these reasons, nations should not be compelled to 
divest themselves of their ethnicity. Instead, members of national ethnic groups should 
feel just as free as members of diasporan groups to express their ethno-cultural 
particularity, and both should do so along liberal lines. That is, so long as national 
ethnicity does not masquerade under the name of the state - which brings us to our last 
concern. 
 
The Separation of Nation and State 
 
 A final difference between traditional and liberal ethnicity concerns the 
relationship between ethnicity and the politico-economic sphere. In contrast to many 
contemporary ethnic leaders, liberal ethnic advocates would attempt to divorce their 
ethnicity from political and economic claims, striving to divert politico-economic 
concerns toward relevant political actors like interest-groups or broad-based parties. 
Ethnicity would only play a political role in two cases: a) if the group considered itself 
the target of explicitly ethnic discriminatory practices, and b) if the group's cultural 
autonomy was threatened.  
A corollary of the above argument is that national (i.e. homeland) ethnic groups 
would abandon the quest to control a state's political structures. This functional divorce 
would involve nothing less than the separation of 'nation' (specifically, the national ethnic 
group) from state. Again, a national ethnic group would seek to influence the policies of 
the jurisdiction in which its homeland rests only if it were the target of ethnic 
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discrimination by powerful minority groups (i.e. Xhosa under apartheid) or if its cultural 
autonomy were threatened (i.e. Welsh). This distinguishes liberal ethnicity (national or 
minority) from many current ethno-nationalist movements, most of which seek to attain 
political and economic power, even at the expense of their cultural particularity. 
Indeed, in a liberal-ethnic world order, national ethnic groups would welcome the 
advent of global governance, much as Wales or Scotland have welcomed the EU. 
Cultural powers, such as immigration control, linguistic policy and education would 
remain under the sway of national ethnic groups, though such groups would have to 
acknowledge the collective rights of transnational ethnic communities within their 
borders. International norms of global multiculturalism would reinforce the collective 
security of ethnic communities, whether inside or outside their home territory - just as 
international norms of human rights would continue to safeguard individual rights. In 
sum, the advent of liberal ethnicity would lead to a considerable revision of current 
liberal and ethnic thinking, to the benefit of both. 
 
Conclusion 
 
I began this essay by identifying an axis of conflict between liberal communitarians and 
liberal individualists over the role of ethnic community. Both believe in the core ideas of 
procedural liberalism, but differ in their vision of the good life. Accordingly, this paper 
accepts the tenets of procedural liberty, but is concerned with the substantive issue of 
positive liberty - what one ought to do with one's liberty. It therefore attempts to delineate 
a cultural project which balances the ideals of autonomy and ethnic community. 
 To do so, I have argued that we must clarify our terminology, specifying the 
difference between ethnic groups and cultures. We must similarly take care to synthesise 
liberalism with the practices of active ethnic communities, not just their passive cultural 
products. This requires a theory of liberal ethnicity, not merely one of liberal culturalism. 
Coming face to face with the reality of ethnicity reveals that much contemporary liberal 
communitarianism is in fact cosmopolitan. This 'pluralist' creed, originally sketched in 
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the first two decades of this century as an anti-nationalist reaction, champions a 
multiculturalism of hybridised individuals, not a multiculturalism of discrete groups. 
Progressive liberal culturalism thereby seeks to retain ethnic culture without ethnic 
community. Therefore, I maintain that liberal culturalism, as it stands, fails to come to 
terms with ethnicity. 
 This is not to suggest that no syntheses between aspects of liberalism and 
ethnicity have been generated by contemporary political theorists. However, new 
developments have fallen short of the significant breakthroughs achieved by the liberal 
nationalists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The notion of liberal ethnicity 
represents an attempt to generate just such a breakthrough.  
It begins by addressing the four features of ethnic community which seem to 
conflict with liberalism, namely, symbolic boundary-maintenance; exclusive, inflexible 
and thick ethnic mythomoteurs; the use of ancestry and race as group boundary markers; 
and the desire among national groups to revive or maintain their ethnicity. Taken at once, 
this paper contends that none of the above features are obstacles to a liberal-ethnic 
synthesis. The key lies in separating the issue of entry criteria from that of symbolic 
exclusivity. In short, the liberal-ethnic perspective presses the liberal case for ethnic 
groups to maintain low entry criteria, while backing the communitarian goals of cultural 
particularism and secure symbolic boundaries. 
Hence, so long as we insist on low barriers to the entry of personnel into a group, 
the demands of ethnic groups for a well-defined symbolic identity may be granted. 
Furthermore, the use of descent and race as symbolic boundaries is not illiberal so long as 
these criteria inform neither barriers to entry nor a status hierarchy based upon ethnic 
capital. Newcomers, by adopting the myths and symbols of the ethnic group and 
attaching themselves to its genealogical history and destiny, can thereby join an ethnic, as 
opposed to merely national, entity.  
A final cornerstone of the liberal-ethnic outlook is that ethnic leaders should strive 
to separate their politico-economic concerns from the state wherever possible. This holds 
for both national and transnational ethnic groups. In recognition of this neutrality toward 
particular groups, states would adopt a multicultural policy at the symbolic level which 
privileges no single community. Together with a vision of liberal ethnicity, this would 
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ensure a cultural order shorn of bias in favour of individualism, as in the West, or 
ethnicity, as in many non-Western societies. This state of affairs thus provides a realistic 
option for advancing both liberal and communitarian principles. 
